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Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) states that ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be
protected by law’. This has been interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights as imposing three distinct
duties on the state: (a) a duty to refrain from taking life
(save in exceptional circumstances); (b) a duty to conduct a
proper and open investigation into deaths for which the
state might be responsible; and (c) a positive duty to protect
life in certain circumstances. The last point, in turn, has two
elements: the ﬁrst is a general duty to put in place a legal
and administrative framework designed to deter threats to
life; the second, called the ‘operational duty’, is an
obligation on the state to take reasonable measures when
there is a ‘real and immediate risk to life’ to an identiﬁed
person to avoid that risk materialising. The risk is one
the authority knows about or should have known about.
The obligation should not impose an impossible or
disproportionate burden on the relevant authorities.1
The legislators drafting Article 2 after the Second
World War had lived through the horrors of early 20th-
century Europe, with its death squads and extrajudicial
state killings. These possibilities were in the minds of the
legislators. Those that may arise in healthcare settings with
regard to the right to life - settings where saving life and
furthering the quality of life in the context of disease is the
purpose - were much less in the minds of the European
Court of Human Rights legislators. Interpreting Article 2 in
healthcare settings is a relatively recent area of legal
activity. Cases considered by the European Court of
Human Rights have established that where a person is
detained by the state as a prisoner, an operational duty
under Article 2 to prevent a suicide applied if certain
conditions were met.2,3 It has also been extended to other
detainees and to army conscripts. A later judgment by the
House of Lords (precursor to the UK Supreme Court) ruled
that it applied similarly to a detained patient in a
psychiatric hospital.4 The categories of persons were all
ones where they fell signiﬁcantly under the control of the
state, and in most cases found themselves in such
circumstances against their will.
In a landmark decision, the new Supreme Court of
the UK ruled that this operational duty imposed by
Article 2 applied to voluntary as well as detained psychiatric
in-patients.5 This article examines some signiﬁcant
implications of this decision for mental health law and for
understandings of the nature of mental healthcare.
The case
The history is taken from the High Court and Court of
Appeal judgment before reaching the Supreme Court.6,7
Twenty-four-year-old Melanie Rabone died by hanging on
20 April 2005. The previous day she had been allowed home
leave from a psychiatric unit where she had been admitted
on 11 April. She had had depression since 2000. On 4 March
2005 she had been admitted to hospital after a suicide
attempt where she tied a pillowcase around her neck. She
was discharged on 18 March after an earlier overnight leave
on the 14th. She then went on a family holiday to Egypt, but
on 31 March, after her return, she cut her wrists with broken
glass. She was not readmitted, apparently as no bed was
available. Follow-up with the trainee psychiatrist on 6 April
revealed that she had occasional thoughts of suicide and
frequent thoughts of self-harm. On 11 April she tied lamp
ﬂex around her neck. Her face became swollen and there
were ligature marks around her neck. Her parents also
found a hosepipe and tape hidden in her room. The medical
notes stated she had a ‘severe depressive episode . . .?
Psychosis, High risk [of self-harm] and suicide’. She was
admitted informally, prescribed medication and placed
under 15-minute observations. A risk assessment using
trust documents was commenced by one of the nurses on
the ward, but further information was required for it to be
completed. On 13 April, Melanie’s father ‘expressed grave
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concern about Melanie’s current condition and her being
sent out on leave or discharged too soon’. There were
further conversations involving her parents along these
lines during the week. Nursing reports in the notes from 16
April stated that her mood was lifting, but Mr Rabone
telephoned the ward on 18 April saying that she was not
improving and that she had expressed ﬂeeting suicidal
thoughts. On 19 April, her consultant, who had been on
leave when Melanie was admitted, returned from leave. The
following was the record in the nursing notes of a meeting
with Melanie and her mother:7
‘Dr Meagher, Dr Davies, SN Erin Booth. Melanie seen with her
mother. She states she self harmed at home due to feeling
angry at herself because of the thoughts she has. Realises that
does not achieve anything. Feels trapped at home ‘‘slightly’’.
Would like to be more independent. Stated enjoyed recent trip
to Egypt. Does not regret leaving employment. Wishes to look
for something else. Does not want to stay in destructive cycle.
Struggling to recognise how she can stop same. Feels she is
lacking in conﬁdence and has low self-esteem. Identiﬁed ways
of addressing issues herself. Would like to leave for up to a
week. Would start looking for job and see friends. Leave agreed
as long as Melanie when seeing her friends does not talk about
herself and become centre of attention. Reasons for this also
discussed. Mother concerned about same as unable to keep eye
on her. Dr Meagher advised Melanie has to take responsibility
for own actions and when has previously harmed herself it has
been when parents keeping an eye on her. Melanie in
agreement that will not self-harm.
Plan - for 2 days/nights leave.’
Melanie left the ward with her mother that evening, and
sometime after 5pm the next day she hung herself from a
tree in a park. The hospital conceded the decision to allow
home leave was negligent.
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal judged
that an operational duty under Article 2 did not apply.6,7
Further appeal was allowed to the Supreme Court, which
ruled that there was an operational duty falling on the
mental health trust under Article 2 to protect the life of
Melanie and that the trust failed to take reasonable
measures to do so.
Exploring reasons for the Supreme Court’s
decision
Differences between the detained patient, the informal
psychiatric patient, and the general medical or surgical
patient
The Supreme Court ruling5 saw the Rabone case, now
involving an informal psychiatric patient, as an extension of
the involuntary psychiatric case where an operational duty
under Article 2 was held to obtain;4 the responsible
authority had (or should have had) the requisite knowledge
of a ‘real and immediate’ risk to the person’s life from self-
harm and that there were reasonable measures that could
have been taken to avoid or prevent that risk.
What was the reasoning? Much turned on the degree of
control exercised by the state on the life at risk. The court
held that the position of the informal psychiatric patient
was relevantly different to that of the general medical or
surgical patient, but to a large degree similar to that of the
detained psychiatric patient.
The court held that whereas autonomous individuals
have the right to act as they wish, for those who are
‘vulnerable’, there may be a special duty to protect them.
‘As regards the voluntary psychiatric patient who is at risk of
suicide and the patient suffering from a life-threatening
physical illness who is in an ‘‘ordinary’’ hospital setting, the
nature of the risk to which these two categories of patient are
exposed is very different. In the case of the suicide of a
psychiatric patient, the likelihood is that, given the patient’s
mental disorder, her capacity to make a rational decision to
end her life will be to some degree impaired . . . Melanie was
admitted to hospital because she was suffering from a mental
disorder and had attempted to commit suicide. The very reason
why she was admitted was because there was a risk that she
would commit suicide from which she needed to be protected.
On the other hand, the patient who undergoes surgery will
have accepted the risk of death on the basis of informed
consent. She may choose to avoid the risk by deciding not to go
ahead with the medical treatment’.5
The analogy with the patient detained under the Mental
Health Act 1983 was regarded as much closer than the
analogy with the patient admitted for treatment of a
physical illness or injury. Lord Dyson observed:
‘By reason of her mental state, [Melanie Rabone] was
extremely vulnerable. The trust assumed responsibility for
her. She was under its control. Although she was not a detained
patient, it is clear that, if she had insisted on leaving the
hospital, the authorities could and should have exercised their
powers under the [Mental Health Act] to prevent her from
doing so. In fact, however, the judge [in the High Court] found
that, if the trust had refused to allow her to leave, she would
not have insisted on leaving. This demonstrates the control
that the trust was exercising over Melanie. In reality, the
difference between her position and that of a hypothetical
detained psychiatric patient, who (apart from the fact of being
detained) was in circumstances similar to those of Melanie,
would have been one of form, not substance’.5
A ‘real and immediate’ risk
and measures to prevent it
Based on the expert evidence, the court judged there was a
‘real and immediate’ risk in this case. A key difference
between the psychiatric and general patient was stated to be
the power of detention available over the former when there
was such a risk. There was also the implication that this was
a measure that did not impose an unreasonable burden on
the authority.
The expert risk assessment accepted by the court was
that the risk of Melanie dying by suicide ‘was approximately
5% on 19 April (after leaving hospital) increasing to 10% on
20 April and 20% on 21 April’.5 This expert had described
the risk of suicide as ‘low to moderate’. The other expert had
put the risk at 70%.6
Four problems raised by the judgment
We will examine, ﬁrst, some of the underlying assumptions
made by the court concerning the position of the psychiatric
patient in relation to other patients, and second, the basis
for the assessment of risk.
Let us ﬁrst set out the groups of persons who are
compared in the Supreme Court judgment:
. prisoners
. detained psychiatric patients
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. informal psychiatric patients
. general medical and surgical patients.
There is a subgroup of general medical and surgical
patients that is not mentioned at all by the court - patients
who are unable to give consent because they lack the
capacity to do so. This group may even constitute the
majority of patients nowadays in, what the court refers to
as, ‘ordinary hospitals’, largely because of aging-associated
disorders such as delirium and dementia.8 Among this group
of patients there will be a signiﬁcant number who are legally
restrained or restricted in their movements, or indeed
effectively detained, under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
Restriction or the use of force under the Act is permitted
when the intervention is necessary in the ‘best interests’ of
the person - that is, to prevent harm and only when it is
proportionate to the seriousness of the harm and its
likelihood. It is an everyday event on medical and surgical
wards that confused patients, for example, post-operatively,
are restrained while attempting to remove necessary
medical devices such as intravenous drips or nasogastric
tubes, or while attempting to leave the ward. Unlike the
Supreme Court, we will recognise this category.
Problem 1: the place of decision-making capacity
The Supreme Court judged that the state’s operational duty
to protect life was engaged for some groups, but not for
others. The Rabone decision extends the operational duty
to informal, non-detained psychiatric patients. Their
vulnerability due to mental illness is as for detained
patients. Although an admission may be informal, the
Mental Health Act can be used to detain the patient. Thus
there is a level of control exercised by the hospital
authorities that is one short step from that exercised over
the detained patient. Indeed, many patients agree to a
voluntary admission because of an unspoken fear that
refusal will result in an involuntary admission, or they may
even be explicitly threatened with such an order. Therefore,
in respect of the operational duty, the Supreme Court
drew a line between informal psychiatric patients and
general patients. For the latter, where the element of
control was deemed to be less, state-mandated clinical
governance and associated arrangements designed to protect
patients - minimum professional standards for training and
registration, mechanisms for monitoring practice, stipulated
measures to be taken if performance is below standard,
inspections, audit, and so on - were held to sufﬁce.
However, by omitting any mention of general patients
who lack capacity and whose movements may be legally
restricted by hospital authorities under the Mental Capacity
Act, the position of the line is obscured. These patients are
unable to give informed consent to dangerous procedures.
They are vulnerable as a result of their illness and the
associated disturbance of mind. We do not see why, on the
basis of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the operational duty
should not apply to this category of patient as well.
This leads to a general problem. By placing substantial
weight on the protection of general patients afforded
through their ability to give informed consent, a question
concerning the place that should be given to decision-
making capacity is thus raised. How, it may be asked, does
the position of the informal psychiatric patient with
capacity differ from the general patient with capacity?
Both groups of patient exist,9 but retention of capacity only
offers legal protection against involuntary treatment for the
general medical or surgical patient. Lady Hale’s statement in
the judgment that ‘we must start from the proposition that
[psychiatric patients] are entitled to the same freedom
and autonomy as everyone else’5 thus remains only an
aspirational starting place, not a real one.
One of us has argued that the law’s inability to start
from this proposition using capacity-based mental health
law for all patients, whether psychiatric or general,
unfairly discriminates against psychiatric patients,
whose ‘autonomy’ and rights to self-determination thus
are not accorded the respect given to general patients.10
A non-discriminatory law would require a lack of
decision-making capacity as the ﬁrst step in the
consideration for involuntary treatment for all patients.
Perhaps Melanie lacked capacity, but we do not know, as it
was not assessed (nor, of course, was this required under the
Mental Health Act).
Problem 2: the place of informality
It might be argued that this ability to override treatment
refusals by psychiatric patients who retain decision-making
capacity gives rise to a further problem. The court saw
little difference between the informal and the detained
psychiatric patient, since the former could either be
detained if treatment were refused or compliance with
treatment could be induced by the patient’s fear that they
would be detained if they failed to agree. But this
apprehension does not seem to exist in the same way
among general patients. Why might that be? After all,
law, such as the Mental Capacity Act, may authorise
deprivations of liberty of the general patient and similar
issues around professional concerns about a refusal of
treatment and pressures to comply can arise. Why does the
possibility of detention so often imply a fact of detention in
psychiatry? The answer may be, in part at least, that unlike
the position of the general patient, the retention of
decision-making capacity by the informal psychiatric
patient offers no legal protection against non-consensual
treatment. An absence of capacity is not a necessary
criterion for involuntary detention under the Mental
Health Act and only in relation to electroconvulsive
therapy is it required for involuntary treatment. A loss of
decision-making capacity does not need to be demonstrated
as it does for the general patient - a signiﬁcant hurdle to the
imposition of involuntary treatment is thus absent.
Regardless of the question of capacity, we believe that
the lack of substance to informality in psychiatric treatment
- a practice of valuing non-coercion in psychiatric care - is
being accepted too easily in the Supreme Court judgment.
There is a problem with how this acceptance may both
exacerbate defensive psychiatric practice and make society
disproportionately aware of the potential of the state to
detain people with mental disorder. The presence of
compulsory powers, so well known to many psychiatric
patients, brings an inevitable shadow. The aim should be to
reduce this shadow and return some reality to the notion of
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informality. The Supreme Court decision does not forward
that aim.
Problem 3: parity between mental and physical health
Should a line be drawn at all within the larger category of
‘patients’ as to who does and who does not engage the
operational duty? When we are admitted to hospital do we
not expect that everything that can be reasonably done
to ensure our safety will be done? Medicine does not use
non-medical criteria to determine the quality of care
offered. The same clinical governance principles and
regulations apply equally across all health services,
including mental health services. Social policy concerning
healthcare does not demarcate categories of patient to
whom a greater or lesser duty of care is owed. Why are
clinical governance and the law of negligence not regarded
as sufﬁcient for both the general and the psychiatric
patients, or, if they are not regarded as sufﬁcient, then
why should the operational duty under Article 2 not apply
to all patients? The Health and Social Care Bill 2012 was
amended by the House of Lords to ensure that the secretary
of state continues the promotion in England of a
comprehensive health service designed to secure improve-
ment in the physical and mental health of the people of
England. This was intended to be a statement of parity
between mental and physical health and the state’s
responsibility for the promotion of such parity is now part
of an Act of Parliament. Why does the Supreme Court in
Rabone apply the operational duty of the state unequally for
physical and mental health? Is it not a problem that it did?
Problem 4: the assessment of risk
The previous issues we have considered relate to the degree
of control the state is able to exercise over different
categories of patient. The operational duty also requires
the presence of a ‘real and immediate’ risk.
When one examines the history of a patient such as
Melanie Rabone, a very persuasive, indeed moving,
narrative can emerge linking previous events (such as a
sequence of suicide attempts, signiﬁcant symptoms of
depression, warnings from others, and so on) to an eventual
suicide. The history is one that is consistent with the
outcome.Why, then, is there a difﬁculty in predicting, with a
signiﬁcant degree of accuracy, such an outcome?
The problem is that there are numerous in-patients
admitted to psychiatric units who have a history that would
be consistent, with hindsight, with an outcome such as
suicide. Yet, such an outcome is rare. Let us consider some
data on in-patient deaths by suicide (which include those
occurring during periods of trial leave). In 2009 there were,
in England, 84 such deaths.11 These occurred in the course
of approximately 120000 admissions involving 108 000
people. The rate of suicide therefore was around 1 in 1400
admissions. We cannot be certain what proportion of the
admissions were for people considered to be at risk of
suicide, but a study that examined reasons for admission for
a number of mental health trusts in London found that for
36%, prevention of suicide was the ‘major’ (21%) or a
‘contributory’ (15%) factor.12 Even if we take only those
where it was the major factor (and disregard the fact that
some in-patient suicides would not even be identiﬁed as
belonging to any prevention of suicide group), the rate of
in-patient suicide would be around 1 in 285 patients.
Presumably for all of these patients, sufﬁciently apparently
suicidal to be admitted to a psychiatric unit, an entirely
plausible narrative culminating in a suicide could, with
hindsight, have been constructed. But how is one to predict
who that one patient who will die by suicide will be?
Rare events are virtually impossible to predict with any
degree of accuracy. ‘False positives’ will overwhelm the
number of ‘true positives’. A meta-analysis of suicide
prediction for the year following discharge from hospital
concluded that if the rate of suicide in the year post-
discharge were, say, 1 in 250, only 1 in 100 of patients judged
to be at ‘high risk’ using a risk assessment instrument would
complete suicide.13
In-patient suicide attempts are more common. In the
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust in the
3 years from 2007, these averaged 34 per annum.14 There
were just under 5000 admissions per annum, so the rate of
suicide attempts was around 1 in 140 admissions. Even
these are virtually impossible to predict without a vast
preponderance of false positives. (During those 3 years
there was only 1 death by suicide.)
These ﬁgures cast serious doubt on the risk assessments
made in the Rabone case retrospectively by the two experts.
How can one arrive, from an actual risk of in-patient suicide
of 1 in 285 admissions (0.4%) in patients admitted to
hospital where clinicians cite prevention of suicide to be a
major reason, to an estimate of 20%, much less 70%? Bear
in mind also that the risk estimate did not cover the entire
admission period, but related to 3 speciﬁed days.
If the court had been advised that the risk was 1 in 285,
or even 1 in 100, would that have been regarded as
constituting a ‘real and immediate’ risk as required for an
operational duty under Article 2?
It can be argued that if a clinician has stated that the
reason for admission is to prevent suicide, and then the
patient subsequently does die by suicide, particularly as an
in-patient, there is a presumption that the treatment has
been inadequate. This, of course, represents a quite extreme
form of ‘hindsight bias’ - knowledge that an event happened
makes it much more likely, with hindsight, that apparently
foreseeable causes will be ascribed than if the outcome is
unknown.15 Although this represents poor logic, perhaps
clinicians also need to think about whether it is sensible to
talk about admitting someone because of the ‘risk of
suicide’, when that risk is, in the short term, somewhere
around 1 in 250, or even if it were 1 in 100. Patients are
generally admitted because they are ill and need treatment
to alleviate unnecessary suffering or the damaging effects of
their illness on their lives in a broad range of possible
domains.
Conclusions
To avoid misunderstanding, we are not claiming that
Melanie Rabone did or did not have decision-making
capacity, nor that she should or should not have been
detained under the Mental Health Act. Our interest is in
where the line for an operational duty under Article 2 (the
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right to life) should be placed in healthcare settings and in
some signiﬁcant general questions raised by the Supreme
Court judgment.
By omitting consideration of the group of general
medical or surgical patients who are unable to give informed
consent to treatment on account of a lack of decision-
making capacity, the court oversimpliﬁed the nature of the
differences between the informal psychiatric patient and
the general patient. Determining where the line for an
operational duty under Article 2 should be placed becomes
substantially more difﬁcult were this group to be included.
It is possible that with this evolving law the operational
duty might extend in the future to medical and surgical
patients in whom decision-making capacity is absent,
including patients seen in accident and emergency
departments or resident care homes. Whether this would
enhance the protection of life as opposed to enhancing
clinical governance, monitoring, state-mandated regulatory
measures, and so on, or how this might work in practice are
questions beyond the scope of this article. The criticism that
the Rabone decision discriminates against persons with a
mental illness would obviously no longer apply.
Related to the problem of where the line (or threshold)
lies for an operational duty is the role of capacity in making
treatment decisions, and we note that the irrelevance of this
patient characteristic in the Mental Health Act represents a
differentiation that some regard as discriminatory and may
now be contributing to the shadow that overhangs those
with a mental illness.
The difference between the detained psychiatric
patient and the informal psychiatric patient was considered
by the Supreme Court as ‘one of form, not of substance’.
Such a state of affairs is certainly not one the Percy Royal
Commission of 1957 intended when it recommended the
principle, accepted by parliament, that informal psychiatric
patients should be in the same position as any other
patients.16 This became the basis for the 1959 Mental Health
Act, and this principle - parity of physical and mental health
- has, in theory at least, remained in place. The Supreme
Court judgment in Rabone, by effectively accepting a
disparity between mental and physical health, makes the
line where the operational duty under Article 2 now falls a
mental v. physical health line.
Our consideration of the expert risk assessments
offered to the court indicates that, when set against
available data on in-patient suicide, they represented a
gross overestimate of the likelihood of suicide. A question
thus arises as to whether the order of the magnitude of the
risk of suicide that obtains in real practice can ever accord
with the requirement of the Article 2 operational duty that
it be ‘real and immediate’. It is not possible to envisage
every situation that might arise in practice, but given the
statistics, short of a patient stating plainly and with
conviction that suicide is their immediate intention, it
would seem most unlikely. In relation to the line where an
operational duty should be drawn, it could be argued that a
‘real and immediate’ risk to life is likely to be substantially
more predictable in serious medical or surgical cases
where treatment failures may, with a high likelihood,
result in death. We add as a general observation that the
misunderstanding of the true likelihood of in-patient
suicide in the Supreme Court’s deliberation is a concrete
instance of the problem of making ‘risk’ such a central plank
in mental health law.
The Supreme Court judgment in Rabone on the
operational duty to protect the right to life brings to the
surface some of the most important problems in mental
health law. The judgment shows how much work there is
left to do to resolve them.
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